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amount of 12,000 acre-feet for any combination of the water right claims.
Teton Canal argued that the removal of the Eureka Reservoir as storage
under the 1890 Notice was contrary to Montana law. Teton Canal argued that
the Eureka Reservoir may remain as storage according to precedent set by
Farmers. However, the Court decided that storage cannot combine with a direct flow water right if the stored water reflects a separate right with its own
priority date. Therefore, the water court properly concluded that the 1936 priority date was assigned to implied water right claims for the Eureka Reservoir,
which is junior to the 1890 Notice direct flow rights.
The Court held that the water court did not err in allowing Teton Canal to
store its 1890 direct flow water in the Eureka River during irrigation season.
Teton Reservoir argued that temporary storage of direct flow cannot constitute
beneficial use. However, Montana law allows a direct flow water user to add

storage as long as the flow and volume of water used does not increase and the
period of diversion does not expand. Teton Canal does not inferfere with other
rights because it is still limited to 8,000 acre-feet of direct flow under the 1890
Notice. Therefore, Teton Canal could store portions of its direct flow right in
the Eureka Reservoir for use later in the irrigation season.
Lastly, the water court did not err by allowing Teton Canal a year-round
period of diversion for the 1890 Notice. The Court concluded that there was
ample evidence to support year-round diversion prior to development of the
Eureka Reservoir. The water court noted that the 1890 Notice included 8,000
acre-feet of direct flow water that Teton Canal diverts between April 20 and
October .14, as well as the 95 acre-feet of water that it diverts between January 1
and December 3. Thus, the water court legitimately concluded that only the
diversion attributed to the former Glendora Reservoir is year-round, which Teton Canal's shareholder meetings supports.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's ruling.
Haley McCullough
NEVADA

Eureka Cty. v. Seventh Judicial Dist Court, 407 P.3d 755 (Nev. 2017)
(holding: (i) that hearing a petition for writ mandamus was proper because addressing a due process issue promptly would favor judicial economy by clarifying notice requirements in a water rights curtailment action; (ii) that Nevada's
Constitution requires procedural due process for a show cause hearing that
could determine curtailment of an individual's junior water rights; and (iii) that
others cannot adequately represent junior water rights holders because water
rights are unique real property interests).
In September of 2011, Sadler Ranch purchased real property and water
rights in Diamond Valley-an over appropriated area of Nevada. Sadler Ranch
claimed that because the ranch was established in the middle of the 19th century, its Diamond Valley water rights are pre-statutory, vested, and senior. However, of the two springs on the ranch, one's flow had diminished substantially,
and the other's flow had disappeared completely. In 2014, Sadler Ranch petitioned for replacement water to compensate for the loss from its springs, but
the State Engineer only awarded a small portion of the amount requested. In
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April 2015, Sadler Ranch responded by petitioning the Seventh Judicial District
to order that the State Engineer begin the proceedings for curtailment of junior
water rights in the valley. The State Engineer proposed making Diamond Valley a critical management area ("CMA"), and Sadler Ranch agreed to stay the
proceedings until the area was oflicially designated a CMA.
However, upon realizing that the CMA designation would not alleviate its
water dispute, Sadler Ranch reinstated proceedings by filing an amended petition. The ranch requested an order either: (1) requiring the State Engineer to
initiate curtailment; or (2) curtailing pumping because the State Engineer intentionally and knowingly refused to follow Nevada law. The State Engineer filed
a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion to dismiss in part,
but denied in part, holding that Sadler Ranch pleaded sufficient facts to conclude that the State Engineer abused his discretion in refusing to initiate curtailment. The district court entered a writ of mandamus requiring the State Engineer to either initiate curtailment proceedings or, in the alternative, show cause
as to why he had refused.
Subsequently, in a motion filed August 2016, the State Engineer argued that
Sadler Ranch must give notice to all Diamond Valley water rights holders who
may suffer the effects of the show cause heaiIng, and Eureka County joined the
motion. Sadler Ranch argued against the motion because a final order of curtailment, which requires notice, could not result from the show cause hearing,
and that upon a final order of curtailment, the State Engineer, who keeps the
appropriators records, must properly provide notice. In October 2016, the district court denied the State Engineer's motion. The court concluded that the
Constitution did not require due process until future proceedings that would
detennine the curtailment's details, like "how" and "who." Furthermore, the
district court concluded that the dozens of interveners in the initial proceedings
adequately represented any parties in interest who did not receive notice. Eureka County and the State Engineer filed a motion for reconsideration, and
upon denial by the district court, Eureka County filed a writ petition to the Nevada Supreme Court.
The Court entertained the writ petition on the basis of its original jurisdiction. The Court described how judicial economy favored addressing the due
process issue early in proceedings and clarifying notice requirements regarding
curtailment of water rights. To compel an act required by law, the Court may
use a writ of mandamus where the lower court used discretion arbitrarily or
capriciously. The Court chose to approach the writ as one of mandamus because it concluded that the district court exercised discretion in an arbitrary and
capncious manner when it denied the State Engineer's motion to compel notice.
The Court addressed the due process question de novo and determined
that the Nevada Constitution required that all junior water rights holders receive
notice prior to the show cause hearing. The Court reasoned that the language
in the order for the show cause hearing indicated that the result could immediately order the initiation of curtailment proceedings. Upon such an order, the
junior holders would only have the option to argue about a cut-off date, but no
option to argue for no curtailment at all. The Court held that the junior holders
needed notice at a meaningful time in order to meet due process requirements.
Finally, the Court addressed the question of representation. The district
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court held that Sadler Ranch need not provide notice to junior holders because
those individuals would have adequate representation by the multiple interveners who already entered the proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that
water rights are real property rights. Because others cannot adequately represent individuals with ownership interest in unique forms of property and because real property rights are unique, the interveners could not represent the
junior holders. The Court concluded that due process required proper notification of the junior water rights holders so that they could adequately represent
their own interests.
Accordingly, the Court ordered a writ of mandamus to vacate the decision
of the district court and directed the district court to order appropriate notice
to all junior water rights holders before conducting the show cause hearing.
Sydney Donovan
SOUTH DAKOTA
Duerre v. Hepler, 892 N.W.2d 209 (S.D. 2017) (holding that: (i) members
of the general public cannot enter and use any of the water and ice on private
property for recreational purposes absent legislative authorization, and (ii) the
Department of Game, Fish, and Parks cannot facilitate access to the water and
ice on private property for recreational purpose absent legislative authorization).
Thad Duerre, Clint Duerre, Robert Duerre and Laron Herr ("Landowners") own two non-meandered sloughs in Day County, South Dakota. The
Landowners reported to the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish, and
Parks ("GF&P") that the public was trespassing on their private property and
using the sloughs for recreational purposes. The GF&P responded that the
public could use the waters if they entered legally. Landowners sued the State,
the GF&P, and the class of persons who used or intended to use the waters in
circuit court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Landowners asked the circuit court to declare that the public has no
legal authorization to use or enter the non-meandered waters on their private
property absent legislative authorization. They also asked the circuit court to
declare that the State may not adopt, enforce, or encourage the public to enter
or use the sloughs for recreational purpose. The Landowners sought to enjoin
the State and class from using the sloughs or adopting a policy allowing members of the public to use the sloughs for recreational purpose.
The State asserted that the Landowners had no right to exclude the public
from using the sloughs because all waters within South Dakota are held in trust
by the State for the public. Additionally, they asserted that GF&P was authorized to allow the public to use the waters so long as they were accessed legally.
The circuit court granted a less broad version of the Landowners' declaratory relief, holding that in the absence of legislative authority, the public may
not enter or use the waters or ice located on the private property for recreational
use. The circuit court also entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the public from entering or using the waters or ice located on the private property for
recreational purposes without permission from the Landowners and prohibiting
the GF&P and others from facilitation access to enter or use the waters or ice

